Global Climatic Cooperation and Emission Rights Allocation
Guocheng Wang
Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economy, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing, China
Chunji Liu *
Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economy, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing, China
*Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Abstract
This paper demonstrates that cooperation is the way to solve emission problem and to find a better dynamic emission rights allocation. We present a model to analyze the difficulty in global climatic cooperation, and the tragic result if there is no cooperation. We preset a weighted formula of equal per capita emission and GDP to solve the dynamic emission rights allocation. We introduce a two-step mitigation path to the global climatic cooperation, and suggest that privatization and marketing may be a way to solve the green house gases emission problem. Game theory is the main method in this paper, theoretical analysis is the character of the paper, and we cited some literatures to demonstrate our standpoints. We discussed the universal of cooperation and a third party in our society, we believe that a court, a country, the United Nations and UNFCCC come into being because they are needed to be a third party that provide public service. Our conclusion is that we need get to a binding agreement to control green house gases emission.
Keywords: Global warming, climatic cooperation, emission rights, carbon markets